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Serology - 58% (67/116)
Hair - 39% (29/75)
Fingerprint - 5% (1/20)
DNA - 17% (3/18)
Shoe print - 16% (1/6)
Bite mark - 71% (5/7)
Voice Spect. - 100% (1/1)
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PCAST Report :
• Overall, it would be appropriate to inform jurors that (1) only two properly 
designed studies of the accuracy of latent fingerprint analysis have been 
conducted and (2) these studies found false positive rates that could be as 
high as 1 in 306 in one study and 1 in 18 in the other study. 
• “We also note it is conceivable that the false-positive rate in real casework 
could be higher than that observed in the experimental studies, due to 
exposure to potentially biasing information in the course of casework.”
• And – “Proficiency testing is essential for assessing an examiner’s capability 
and performance in making accurate judgments.” 
14
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How do jurors interpret the evidence?
• How to convey forensic information in the courtroom in a way that is









119 WEST VIRGINIA L. REV. 621 
(2016) 
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Prior work: How Jurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence: 
The Relative Importance of Match Language, Method 
Information and Error Acknowledgement
Brandon Garrett & Gregory Mitchell
10 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 484 (2013) 
Fingerprint evidence benefits from common beliefs and 
background assumptions in uniqueness and reliability of 
fingerprint identification
Language may not be important once jury is told a match was 
made (Match = Match to Exclusion of All Others = 100% Certain = 
Other Source a Practical Impossibility….)
Error statements by forensic experts 
should be given greater attention by 
courts and researchers
17
Research funded by the Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE) - forensicstats.org
Litigate 
Proficiency
• Seek discovery on proficiency
• Introduce proficiency data at trial
• Brandon L. Garrett and Gregory Mitchell, 
The Proficiency of  Experts, 166 UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 901
(2018) 
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1995 (9508) 7 156 22% (34) 43% (67) 3% (6)
1996 (9608) 11 184 8% (14) N/A N/A
1997 (9708) 11 204 10% (21) 28% (58) N/A
1998 (9808) 11 219 6% (14) N/A 35% (77)
1999 (99-516) 12 231 6% (14) N/A 32% (75)
2000 (00-516) 10 278 4% (11) N/A N/A
2001 (01-516) 11 296 3% (8) N/A N/A
2001 (01-517) 11 120 20% (24) N/A N/A
2002 (02-516) 11 303 4% (13) N/A 1% (2)
2002 (02-517) 10 146 3% (5) 4% (6) 1% (2)
2002 (02-518) 12 31 0% (0) 3% (1) 3% (1)
2003 (03-516) 10 336 1% (4) 8% (26) N/A
2003 (03-517) 12 188 1% (5) 12% (22) N/A
2003 (03-518) 9 28 7% (2) 11% (3) N/A
2004 (04-516) 12 206 4% (12) 3% (7) N/A
2004 (04-517-518) 15 259 6% (15) 2% (5) N/A
2005 (05-516) 16 327 1% (3) 9% (28) At least 1
2005 (05-517-518) 16 250 5% (12) 2% (6) N/A
2006 (06-516) 15 333 23% (78) 3% (11) N/A
2007 (07-516) 15 351 4% (14) 5% (18) N/A
2007 (07-517-518) 15 315 4% (13) 14% (45) 6% (20)
2008 (08-516) 15 300 1% (3) 5% (14) N/A
2008 (08-517-518) 15 391 1% (5) 2% (6) 1% (2)
2009 (09-516) 16 321 11% (35) N/A N/A
2009 (09-517-518) 16 419 1% (5) 2% (8) 1% (4)
2010 (10-516) 16 331 8% (26) 2% (5) N/A
2010 (10-517-518) 16 463 13% (60) N/A N/A
2011 (11-516) 15 335 9% (30) N/A 1% (3)
2011 (11-517-518) 16 478 4% (17) 0 .2% (1)
2012 (12-515-516) 16 350 3% (9) 2% (6) N/A
2012 (12-517-518) 12 555 3% (16) 1% (8) N/A
2013 (13-515-516) 12 409 2% (8) .2% (1) 6% (24)
2013 (13-517-518) 15 469 3% (12) 8% (38) N/A
2014 (14-515-516) 12 424 4% (18) 3% (13) N/A
2014 (14-517-518) 12 587 11% (62) 9% (53) .3% (2)
2015 (15-515/516) 11 536 7% (39) 12% (59) .1% (1)
2015 (15-517) 11 509 4% (21) 11% (57) .1% (1)
2015 (15-519) 3 292 23% (36) N/A N/A
2016 (16-515-516) 16 431 10% (41) 3% (11) N/A
Table 1: CTS Fingerprint Proficiency Test Results, 1995-2016
18







New work in progress: The Impact of Proficiency Testing Information and 
Error Aversions on the Weight Given to Fingerprint Evidence 
(Mitchell & Garrett)
19
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Print Likelihood Ratings by 
Proficiency Level and Error 
Aversion Group
20
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Conclusions
• The examiner’s level of performance on a proficiency test (high, medium, 
low, or very low), but not the type of errors committed on the test (false 
positive identifications, false negative identifications, or a mix of both types 
of errors), affected the weight given to the examiner’s identification 
opinion, which in turn affected judgments of the defendant’s guilt.  
• Those with stronger aversions to false acquittals than false convictions, 
older participants, and White and Asian participants gave greater weight to 
the fingerprint evidence, but all groups were sensitive to information about 
the examiner’s proficiency level.  
• Finally, our results suggest that jurors assume that fingerprint examiners 
are highly proficient but not perfect:  evidence showing that an examiner’s 
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New work: Comparing Categorical and 
Probabilistic Fingerprint Evidence 
• FRSTAT:  "The latent print on Exhibit ## and the standards bearing the 
name XXXX have corresponding ridge detail. The probability of 
observing this amount of correspondence is approximately ## times 
greater when impressions are made by the same source rather than 
by different sources.” 
22
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Garrett, Mitchell & Scurich, recently published: J Forensic 
Sci, 2018, doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.137 97
• The most probative FRSTAT 
conclusions were weighted as 
stronger than a traditional 
identification conclusion.
• The less probative FRSTAT 
conclusions were weighted 
less, but without 
discrimination among the 
higher and lower probability 
evidence.
• Additional language 
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Reliability in the Lab
CSAFE/ 
University of Virginia
(now Duke Law too)
• Sharon Kelley, JD, PhD
• Daniel Murrie, PhD
• Brandon Garrett, JD
Houston Forensic 
Science Center 
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Latent Prints Across 2,536 Cases
• Total Number of Latent Prints Analyzed: 12,363
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Verification and Consultation
N = 2,536 Cases 
3% of all cases 
proceed to 
Consultation 
• è During Verification, analysts 
agree 93% of the time
7% (n = 82) of cases 
that have been 
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Results of Consultation 
• 82 cases, 132 prints 
• Final decisions are typically those of  
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Post-Consultation Decisions: Value/No Value 
Conclusion Frequency Conclusion Changed 
During Consultation 
Latent of No Value à
Latent of Value
18 Yes
Latent of Value à
Latent of No Value
14 Yes 
Latent of Value 
Remains
8 No
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Post-Consultation Decisions: 
Identification/Inconclusive/Exclusion
Conclusion Frequency Conclusion Changed During 
Consultation 
Exclusion à Identification 22 Yes
Exclusion à Inconclusive 15 Yes




Inconclusive à Identification 12 Yes
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Conflict Resolution
• 8 Cases, 10 prints 
• 50% case analyst conclusion; 50% verifier conclusion 
Conclusion Frequency Conclusion Changed During 
Conflict Resolution
Latent of Value à Latent No Value 2 Yes
No Value Remains 2 No 
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Prescott and I sp nt working together the night before trial was dedicated to developing the 
image in Figure 4 below and then structuring the cross-examination around it.  
 
 
Figure 4: This image above is the slide that was used at trial to illustrate the four dots that were missing 
from the annotation of the latent print during the comparison phase and the additional three dots that were 
added in the wrong color after the annotation during the analysis phase.  
 
During trial, each ring in Figure 4 appeared one by one (first red, followed by orange), 
accompanied by a corresponding cross-examination question. The purpose of addressing the dots 
within each of the rings one by one was to emphasize the number of mistakes that were made – 
not two (removing dots and coloring others incorrectly), but seven (removing four dots and 
coloring another three incorrectly). Because Ms. Maback denied ever making a single mistake in 
her analysis of roughly 800,000 prints over the course of her career, emphasizing that she 
undeniably made seven mistakes in this case alone was a strong point for the defense’s case theory. 
A trial exhibit one of the teams 
prepared using case file images 
prepared and shared by the Virginia 
Department of Forensic Services.
32
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How are the prints marked?
33
33
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How about Judges?  Judicial Instructions?
• Although “commissions come 
and go” there is “mounting 
judicial, and public concern…”
34
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Brandon L. Garrett & Chris Fabricant, 
The Myth of the Reliability Test, 
86 Fordham L. Rev. 1559 (2018) 
• We assembled a collection of 229 state 
criminal cases that quote and in some 
minimal fashion discuss the reliability 
requirement. 
• We find that in the unusual cases in 
which state courts discuss reliability 
under Rule 702 they invariably admit the 
evidence, largely by citing to precedent 
and qualifications of the expert or by 
acknowledging but not acting upon the 
reliability concern. In short, the supposed 
reliability test adopted in Rule 702 is 
rarely applied to assess reliability. 
35
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Appendix II:  State Rule 702 Adoption 
and Usage in Criminal Cases 
State Year Adopted 
Cases Discussing 
Reliability 
Alabama165 2012 1 
Arizona 2012 17 
Delaware 2001 4 
Florida 2013 1 
Georgia 2013 0 
Indiana166 1994 18 
Kansas 2014 1 
Kentucky 2007 3 
Louisiana 2014 5 
Massachusetts167 n/a 6 
Maryland 1993 1 
Michigan 2004 59 
Mississippi 2003 37 
Missouri 2017 0 
New Hampshire 2016 2 
North Carolina 2011 14 
Ohio168 1994 22 
 
 165. The Alabama rule has the same reliability language but a slightly different structure 
(as well as additional provisions regarding juvenile cases, medical testimony, and use of DNA 
evidence). ALA. R. EVID. 702.  Regarding expert evidence generally, the rule states: 
(b) In addition to the requirements in section (a), expert testimony based on a 
scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if: 
(1) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
Id. 
 166. IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (requiring that the expert testimony “rests upon reliable scientific 
principles”).  The Rule included a reliability prong upon its adoption in 1994.  A 2014 revision 
edited the structure, but the text of the reliability prong remained the same. 
 167. Massachusetts does not have official rules of evidence, but the Supreme Judicial Court 
recommends the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Press Release, Mass.gov, 2017 Edition of 
the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence Now Available (Feb. 24, 2017), 
https://www.mass.gov/news/2017-edition-of-the-massachusetts-guide-to-evidence-now-
available [https://perma.cc/7JZG-G8YY]; see also Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 
1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (adopting the Daubert rationale) 
 168. Ohio Rule of Evidence 702 varies significantly from the federal rule, providing: 
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Oklahoma169 2013 3 
South Dakota 2011 2 
Utah170 2007 13 
Vermont 2004 7 
West Virginia 2014 2 
Wisconsin 2011 11 
 
 
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other 
specialized information.  To the extent that the testimony reports the result of a 
procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if all of the following 
apply: 
(1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based is 
objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, 
facts, or principles; 
(2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably implements the 
theory; 
(3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a way that will 
yield an accurate result.  
OHIO R. EVID. 702. 
 169. The Oklahoma rule provides, using the same language as the federal rule, “(1) The 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably 
to the facts of the case.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2702 (West 2017). 
 170. Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for 
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods 
that are underlying in the testimony 
(1) are reliable, 
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and 
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts. 
UTAH R. EVID. 702. 
35
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Eyewitness Testimony Study Participants
• 1,614 adult participants received approximately $3 for 
completing the survey. Av. time complete: 14 min. 
• Gender: 48% male, 52% female 
• Mean age 46, median 46 
• Race: 12% Black, 4% Asian, 69% White, 14% Latino,  1% 
Other 
• 19% Midwest, 21% Northeast, 38% South, 33% West 
• 32% reported having served previously on a jury 
Link to study materials:
Jury Instructions and Eyewitness Confidence in the Courtroom, at 
https://osf.io/gep9v/.
36
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1. Control condition (no judicial instructions)
2. Brief directive instruction regarding eyewitness confidence
3. Massachusetts instruction on eyewitness confidence
4. Direction to discount in-court confidence, with an explanation for the reasons why one should
do so
5. Both pre-instruction with a direction and explaining reasons why one should discount in-
court confidence and an instruction at the conclusion of the case providing that direction
and reasoning.
6. Instruction explaining reasons why one should discount in-court confidence and an error
frequency of 20 in 100 times for such low-confidence eyewitnesses.
7. Instruction explaining reasons why one should discount in-court confidence and an error
frequency of 66 in 100 times for such low-confidence eyewitnesses.
7 Conditions (6 versions of Judicial Instructions)
37
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“Where a witness has identified the defendant as the person who committed the alleged
crime, you should examine the identification with care. As with any witness, you must
determine the witness’s credibility, that is, do you believe the witness is being honest? Even if
you are convinced that the witness believes his or her identification is correct, you still must
consider the possibility that the witness made a mistake in the identification. A witness may
honestly believe he or she saw a person, but perceive or remember the event inaccurately.
You must decide whether the witness’s identification is not only truthful, but accurate. People
have the ability to recognize others they have seen and to accurately identify them at a later
time, but research and experience have shown that people sometimes make mistakes in
identification.
You may consider a witness’s identification even where the witness is not free from doubt
regarding its accuracy. But you also should consider that a witness’s expressed certainty in
an identification, standing alone, may not be a reliable indicator of the accuracy of the
identification, especially where the witness did not describe that level of certainty when the
witness first made the identification.”
Massachusetts instruction 
38
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Reasons:
“Research shows that the memory of an eyewitness does not improve over time. The
most reliable information about a witness’ level of confidence comes from the police
lineup conducted before trial. Research also shows that eyewitnesses who express
uncertainty or a low level of confidence at the time of a police lineup are far more
likely to make an incorrect identification than those who express certainty.”
In addition, many factors can cause eyewitnesses to express more confidence in their
identification in the courtroom than what they expressed at the initial identification
in the police department. None of these factors is related to the eyewitness having a
more accurate memory now than when they made the initial identification.
Then a directive:
For these reasons, you should ignore the level of
confidence that a witness expresses in the courtroom.
Instead, you should rely on what the witness said at the
time of the prior police lineup identification.
39
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Massachusetts Instructions
40
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Instruction with Explanation and Reasoning
41
Research funded by the Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence (CSAFE) - forensicstats.org
Figure 3.Plot of Decision to Convict and Jury and Judicial Instruction Variables
Q26 - Would you convict this defendant?
The di erences in proportions follow the same pattern as was found in Q18. There is strong evidence that the proportion of “yes” in condition 1 is
di erent from the other conditions. The proportions of conditions 2 and 3 are di erent from the other conditions. The proportions of conditions 4, 5, 6,


















Control Brief Mass Reas Pre+Reas Reas+20 Reas+66
This involves the arcsine squareroot transformation of the proportion of “would you convict”, shows little change from the raw data. The transformation
is used for variance stabilization purposes.
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